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Past research on the nature of small group problem solving has 
led to contradictory findings. Using complex problems, Shaw (1954b) 
found a decentralized interaction structure, i.e.,a group arrangement 
in which group members can communicate freely, to be most effective in 
reaching accurate solutions. Mulder (1960), using Shaw's complex prob­
lems, found a centralized decision structure, i.e., a group arrangement 
in which decisions were made by a small proportion of group members, 
to be most effective in reaching accurate solutions. Hutte (1965), 
suggested greater accuracy was found when a decentralized decision 
structure was used in complex problem solving. In none of these 
studies was there an independent and systematic treatment of the 
effects of decision and interaction structures.
The present study was conducted to test a proposed structural 
model of small group problem solving. The model, derived largely from 
the research of Bales (1950), and the theoretical work of Homans (1961), 
suggests that accuracy of problem solving and indices of group process 
will vary as a function of the interaction and decision structures. It 
was hypothesized that the degree of congruence between the centrality 
of the decision and interaction structures would be reflected in indices 
of group process and problem solving outcomes.
There were 4 conditions of structural congruence: 1) decision 
centrality high, interaction centrality high; 2) decision centrality
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high, interaction centrality low; 3) decision centrality low, interac­
tion high; 4) decision centrality low, interaction centrality low. 
Conditions 1 and 4 were described as structurally congruent, and con­
ditions 2 and 3 were described as structurally incongruent. Under 
each of these conditions, 6 groups, each composed of 4 Ss, solved 3 
complex problems.
Statistically significant interactions for the conditions of 
decision and interaction centrality supported the proposed structural 
model. The congruence of the decision and interaction structures was 
reflected in both time and number of information transactions required 
to reach the solution to each problem.
Support for the model was not found in the problem solving out­
comes of accuracy of problem solving, perceived effectiveness of prob­
lem solving, and subjective satisfaction. Contrary to both Shaw and 
Mulder's research, groups with decentralized decision structures were 
found to be more accurate in their problem solutions. However, Ss 
perceived a centralized decision structure as more effective in solv­
ing problems. Subjective satisfaction was highest within a cen­
tralized interaction structure.
Based on the findings of this study, it might be generally 
predicted that a group which contains a decentralized decision struc­
ture will be more accurate in solving complex problems than a group 
with a centralized decision structure. If the dimension of a decen­
tralized interaction structure is added to this group, the partici­
pants will, in all probability, like their task more than if the 
interaction structure is relatively centralized. Predictions
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regarding time and number of information transactions to solution will 
be most accurately made in terms of the combinations of conditions of 
decision and interaction structures. The Ss will bring into the group 
setting certain pressures and preferences for a centralized decision 
structure. If allowed a choice, a centralized decision structure will 





For the past 20 years studies of the effects of communication 
patterns on performances of small groups have, collectively, comprised 
one of the more productive research areas in social psychology.
Efforts to understand significant dimensions of group problem solving 
have typically employed the communication model developed by Bavelas 
(1948) and Leavitt (1951). In this model, small groups are required 
to solve problems within pre-established communication networks, e.g., 
position A and B share a communication channel, positions A and C 
share a communication channel, but B and C can communicate only 
through A. Variations in the model have resulted in a nomenclature 
which has attained considerable generality of usage in small group 
literature, and is indicated in Figure 1.n n e
Chain Circle Comcon or All
Channel
Fig. 1. Communication networks in 4 person groups. Circles 
represent positions, lines represent communication 
channels.
Most studies have isolated Ss from each other through the use of par­
titions, and have permitted only written or electrical transmission 
of information between positions.
1
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The problems investigated have traditionally been dichotomized
as simple or complex, with research findings depending, in part, upon
which type problem was employed. A simple problem, sometimes referred
to as a Leavitt-type problem, is as follows:
To each S, labeled by color, is given a card on which there 
appears a set of five symbols. Each S's card is different 
from all the others in that the symbol lacking, the sixth 
one, is a different symbol in each case. Thus in any set 
of five cards there is only one symbol in common. The prob­
lem is for every member to find the common symbol (Leavitt,
1951, p. 41).
A complex problem requires that the Ss engage both in more 
sophisticated cognitive activities and a greater frequency and variety 
of information transmission than does the simple problem. The follow­
ing is an example:
A small company is moving from one office building to another.
It must move four kinds of equipment: chairs, desks, filing 
cabinets, and typewriters. How many trucks are needed to make 
the move in one trip?
Items:
Each truck will carry 12 typewriters and nothing else.
The company owns a total of 15 filing cabinets.
The company owns a total of 12 typewriters.
Each truck will carry 5 filing cabinets and nothing else.
Each truck will carry 24 chairs and nothing else.
The company owns a total of 48 chairs.
The company owns a total of 12 desks.
Each truck will carry 3 desks and nothing else. Answer: 10 trucks. 
A copy of the problem is given to each S. The items of information are 
equally and randomly distributed among Ss.
Table 1 contains a synopsis of communication network findings. 
While there is no unanimity regarding the relative effectiveness of 
various networks, reviews of the literature (Shaw, 1964; Jones and 
Gerard, 1967) have generally held that centralized communication chan­
nels (e.g. wheel) will lead to more effective problem solution with
3
TABLE 1




Network solution rate 
(in descending order) Task
Leavitt 1951 5 Wheel (fastest trial) Simple
Heise and 
Miller




Hirota 1953 5 No significant difference Simple
Shaw 1954a 4 No significant difference Complex






1955 5 Wheel: All-channel: Circle 
(stable nets— no signif.diff.
Simple
)
Shaw 1956 4 All-channel: Wheel Complex
Shaw and 
Rothschild
1956 4 All-channel: Wheel Complex
Guetzkow and 
Dill
1957 5 All-channel: Circle Simple
Shaw, Rothschild 
and Strickland
1957 4 All-channel: Wheel Complex
Shaw 1958 4 All-channel: Wheel Complex
Mulder 1959 4 Wheel Simple







1960 5 Wheel Simple
Cohen, Bennis 
and WoIkon
1961 5 Wheel Simple
Cohen, Bennis 
and WoIkon






Network solution rate 
(in descending order) Task
Lawson 1964a 4 (NR)a All-channel, Wheel: Circle 
(R) Wheel, All-channel: Circle
Simple
Lawson 1964b 4 (NR) All-channel: Circle: Wheel 
(R) All-channel, Circle: Wheel
Complex
Burgess 1968 4 (NR) Wheel: Circle
(R) No significant difference
Simple
Simple
a NR = nonreinforced; R = reinforced.
simple problems; decentralized communication channels (e.g., circle or 
all channel) will lead to more effective problem solution with complex 
problems.
In the early years of communication-problem solving research 
there was considerable interest in the study of the feelings of satis­
faction and dissatisfaction in participants following their completion 
of problem solutions. Satisfaction was found to be relatively higher 
among participants who had occupied positions of centrality in the net, 
such as the hub in the wheel net (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951;
Christie et al.. 1952). However, the research was conducted using 
simple problems. Shaw (1954b), using complex problems, found a rever­
sal of the earlier satisfaction results. Shaw noted that satisfaction 
needed to be interpreted in terms of both the centralization of the 
communication net and the type problem. He agreed with Bavelas, 
Leavitt, et al. that satisfaction would be higher among participants
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when a simple problem was solved by a highly centralized group. However, 
Shaw found that when a complex problem was solved by a highly centralized 
group, rated satisfaction was lower than among participants in a decen­
tralized group.
A model has been developed (Leavitt, 1951; Shaw, 1954a) which is 
based on the concepts of independence and saturation. Independence 
refers to the extent to which a position in a communication network 
has restrictions on its freedom of action. As developed by Leavitt 
and Shaw, positions of low independence, with restrictions on freedom 
of action, result in frustration of personal needs for autonomy. Con­
sequently, a position such as the hub position in the wheel net, one 
which might be described as having maximal freedom of action, would 
be a position in which a participant would feel considerable satis­
faction.
The concept of saturation, developed by Gilchrist et_ al.
(1954), refers to the information input or output requirements of a 
net position. A position is said to be saturated when its efficiency 
of operation is impeded by an overload of incoming messages, or a 
necessity to communicate too rapidly with other participants. The 
most central position, or hub, which is high in independence, would 
be unlikely to be saturated when a simple problem was being solved. 
However, if a complex problem were to be introduced, the hub position 
might become saturated with input and output demands, only some of 
which could be met. This would lead to feelings of frustration and 
dissatisfaction in occupants of the hub position. Because of these 
factors, Gilchrist argues, a centralized net such as the wheel is
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not as effective in solving complex problems as a less centralized 
net.
Gilchrist notes that groups organized around decentralized com­
munication nets, whether working with simple or complex problems, are 
not likely to overload or saturate any single position. Participants 
in each position have the opportunity to act on each problem, or, to 
exercise independence. Consequently, both feelings of satisfaction 
and effectiveness of problem solving would be greater in less cen­
tralized nets when the groups are solving complex problems.
Others have indicated some support for Gilchrist's position 
regarding the relationship between satisfaction and independence.
Maier and Hoffman (1960, 1962) found satisfaction to be positively 
correlated both with group decision making, and the degree of influ­
ence the participant had over the final decision.
A conceptual model for group problem solving which is almost 
entirely based on the nature of the interaction structure has come 
under some criticism from Mulder (1960). The crux of Mulder's criti­
cism is that researchers have taken perhaps too shallow a view of what 
is occurring within the communication nets. More specifically, Mulder 
argues that too much emphasis has been placed on the topological struc­
ture of communication nets. The topological or structural character­
istics of the nets do not really determine what occurs. Rather, the 
structural arrangement of the communication channels establishes 
limits or parameters within which a decision structure emerges.
Mulder defines decision structure as "who makes decisions for whom," 
and hypothesizes that within any group a centralized decision structure
7
must emerge if that group is to effectively and efficiently solve prob­
lems. Thus, whether a circle (decentralized net) or wheel (centralized 
net) is used as an interaction system, it serves only as a point of 
departure from which a decision structure emerges. A decision struc­
ture may emerge more rapidly from the wheel as opposed to the circle, 
but over a period of time decision structures of similar effectiveness 
will emerge from both. Visible differences in the effectiveness of 
problem solving of circle and wheel nets disappear as both nets reach 
roughly equivalent plateaus of problem solving performance.
Recent findings reported by Burgess (1968), while focusing on 
reinforcement contingencies in small group problem solving, rather 
than the emergence of decision structures, also indicate that circle- 
wheel net differences in problem solving effectiveness disappear over 
trials, and a "steady state" of performance occurs.
Thus, as researchers have focused on the dimensions within and 
surrounding communication nets, numerous factors of considerable com­
plexity and importance have become visible. For the early communica­
tion net researchers such as Leavitt _et _al. the communication channel 
structure determined whatever level of performance occurred. Generally 
a relatively less effective performance was expected when a decen­
tralized net solved a problem. In later research this was true only 
for relatively simple problems. These performances by respective nets 
were expected to occur consistently, over trials. Steady states of 
performances would occur, but at differing levels of effectiveness. 
Later researchers, Mulder and Burgess, assert that steady states 
emerge in problem solving performances of groups, these plateaus
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arising both through the emergence of a centralized decision structure 
even within a decentralized net, and reinforcement contingencies sur­
rounding problem solving.
Burgess' treatment of the reinforcement contingencies which 
affect group processes would seem to give some stability to those 
aspects of a conceptual model of group problem solving which are con­
cerned with external factors. Mulder's research would seem to place 
critical internal group processes within a workable conceptual model, 
one which moves beyond a simple topological conception of the problem 
solving process. However, recent findings raise some questions about 
Mulder's concept of an emergent centralized decision structure.
Hutte (1965), in an investigation of problem solving in an all 
channel net, found a negative correlation between the degree of cen­
tralization of decision making, and the effectiveness of the groups' 
problem solving. While these findings were obtained with a somewhat 
more complex problem and different communication structure (all chan­
nel net) than those in Mulder's investigations, they suggest conclu­
sions which are contradictory to those of Mulder.
Summarized, the preceding review of the literature indicates 
the following:
1. Shaw, using Bavelas-Leavitt type communication nets, found 
that decentralized communication nets were more effective in solving 
complex problems than were centralized nets.
2. Mulder has indicated that the communication net is not the 
critical issue; rather, the focus must be placed on the decision struc 
ture which emerges within the topology of a communication net. From
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research with both centralized and decentralized nets, Mulder has con­
cluded that in either case a centralized decision structure is neces­
sary for effective problem solution.
3. Hutte has found that groups with centralized decision 
structures tended to be less effective in solving complex problems 
than groups with more decentralized decision structures.
The problematical and contradictory findings in the preceding 
may stem from a confusion of research strategies, and the need to 
articulate possible underlying structural aspects of communication 
and decision structures. Shaw, working with the Bavelas-Leavitt 
model, has been primarily concerned with problem solving as a func­
tion of the communication or interaction structures of small groups. 
Mulder and Hutte have concerned themselves with decision structures 
in small groups, and have done so under the conditions of differing 
interaction structures, with contradictory findings resulting. None 
of these researchers has articulated a research model which contains 
both interaction and decision structures as major components. Rather, 
their respective investigations have been based on primary concerns 
with each, but not both, of these dimensions.
A conceptual model which is concerned with an integrative 
treatment of both interaction and decision making systems might be 
helpful in understanding underlying processes in problem solving 
groups. A two dimensional theory of group process has precedence 
in small group literature. Investigations of leader roles in small 
groups have pointed to the importance of a two dimensional theory 
of group interaction. Largely under the leadership of Bales
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(1950, 1955, 1956, 1958; Bales and Slater, 1955; Borgatta and Bales, 
1953; Slater, 1955) these investigations have led to the differentia­
tion of two distinct types of leader roles. These roles, termed task 
and social-emotional specialists, have distinctive characteristics.
The task specialist's role is one concerned with facilitating group 
problem solving, goal attainment, and designing decision making strat­
egies. The social-emotional specialist's role is one concerned with 
social processes in the group, and means of facilitating interaction. 
According to Bales, these two specialized roles develop in the leader­
ship of virtually all productive problem solving groups.
If Bales' research and theory is conceptualized as focusing on 
two basic components of group problem solving processes, rather than 
two specific types of roles, it bears considerable resemblance to the 
Shaw-Mulder research. That is, if a) rather than focusing on a social 
emotional leader, the conceptual model is extended to an interaction 
system or structure, in which the social-emotional leader plays a pri­
mary role; and, b) rather than focusing on a task leader the model is 
extended to encompass a decision making system or structure, in which 
the task leader plays a primary role, then a two factor structural 
model of group problem solving begins to develop.
Other, perhaps more commonplace, observations of problem solv­
ing groups in everyday life also suggest that a two factor conceptual 
model of small groups might be appropriately applied. Members of deci 
sion making committees in the academic, business, and political worlds 
have often pointed to the problems created by these two structural 
aspects of small problem solving groups. For example, interaction
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might be highly centralized in a small number of the members of a com­
mittee. The decision structure of that committee, however, might be 
highly decentralized, requiring a majority vote or even consensus in 
order for the group to resolve a question or issue. Conversely, 
interaction might be decentralized, with all members participating in 
the discussion, but the decision structure highly centralized, with 
one or two members of the group making decisions. From anecdotal 
reports, subjective reactions to these kinds of situations, as well 
as the quality of productivity of the group, often vary as a function 
of the congruent or incongruent relationships between these two dimen­
sions .
Similarly, many participants report varying reactions in sit­
uations in which there is a more congruent relationship between the 
interaction and decision structures in the group. For example, when 
a freedom of interaction exists, with most members of the group inter­
acting with most other members, and when most or all the members have 
a voice in the decision making processes of the group (e.g., majority 
vote or consensus), feelings of satisfaction and the indices of pro­
ductivity seem to be relatively higher than when there is an incon­
gruous relationship between interaction and decision structures.
Congruous relationships between interaction and decision 
structures in restricted communication nets, e.g., wheel, with cen­
tralized decision structures; e.g., 1 decision maker, also may lead 
to relatively satisfying, productive, relationships. For example, 
work details in the Armed Forces, athletic teams, and various com­
mittees .
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There is no body of information regarding theory and research 
on congruence between interaction and decision structures in small 
groups. However, congruence in other dimensions, particularly status, 
have been examined. Based largely on theories of cognitive consist­
ency (Heider, 1946; Newcomb, 1953; Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; 
Festinger, 1957), studies of status congruence in small groups have 
indicated that varieties or problems, such as lowered morale and 
decrements in quality of problem solution, occur as a function of 
the status incongruence among participants (e.g., Adams, 1953; Exline 
and Ziller, 1959; Sampson, 1963).
Another student of congruence in small groups, Homans, has 
offered a conceptual framework within which congruence among dimen­
sions of human relationships might be examined. Homans (1961) 
introduces the concept of distributive justice as a means of artic­
ulating the importance of congruence in the many dimensions of inter­
personal relationships in small groups. The "rule of distributive 
justice" is stated thus:
A man in an exchange relation with another will expect that 
the rewards of each man be proportional to his costs— the 
greater the rewards, the greater the costs— and that the net 
rewards, or profits, of each man be proportional to his 
investments— the greater the investments, the greater the 
profit. (1961, p. 75)
Extending Homans' concept into the arena of problem solving 
processes, it would seem, hypothetically, that people would be less 
likely to be disturbed if the formal leader of a group made a deci­
sion for a group (hence received the greater reward), if he alone 
had invested his energies in gathering information which permitted 
a decision to be reached. And further, that individuals would become
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rather upset if, as group members, they had invested considerable energy 
in garnering information and other activities aimed at providing a basis 
for decision making, only to have the leader arbitrarily render a deci­
sion.
Following Homans' rationale, distributive justice in small group 
problem solving processes would exist when the participants' expendi­
tures of energy' in the interaction structure were proportional to their 
expenditures of energy in the decision structure. The decision and 
interaction structures might then be described as congruent, i.e., par­
ticipants who have a high investment of energy in the interaction sys­
tem also have a proportionally high investment of energy in the deci­
sion system. Conversely, participants who have a low investment of 
energy in the interaction system also have a low investment of energy 
in the decision system.
To the extent that participants invest disproportionate ener­
gies in either the interaction or decision systems, there is a lack 
of structural congruence. Under the condition of structural incon­
gruence participants who have a high investment of energies in the 
interaction system will have a disproportionately low investment of 
energies in the decision system. Conversely, participants who have 
a high investment of energies in the decision system will have a dis­
proportionately low expenditure of energies in the interaction system. 
For example, a participant might find himself deeply involved in the 
interaction surrounding problem solving, but denied any part in the 
decision processes which lead to the problem solution. He might feel 
cheated. Similarly, a participant might find himself immersed in the
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decision process, without having participated substantially in the 
interaction necessary to arrive at the decision making stage of prob­
lem solution. Following Homans* rationale of economic exchange, this 
participant might feel as though he had "made a profit." However, an 
important by-product of the latter situation is that other partici­
pants must relinquish part of the group's collective decision making 
powers to this participant who has made little or no previous invest­
ment in the group's interaction processes. The condition of distrib­
utive justice is not present, and, following Homans, the resulting 
condition of social friction, including possible anger or resentment, 
will interfere with the current task.
In the present study it is proposed that problem solving groups 
be conceptualized as composed of interaction and decision structures, 
and that outcomes of the problem solving process be examined in rela­
tionship to the congruence of these structural variables. If this 
structural model were to be used as a conceptual tool in analyzing 
(or studying) problem solving groups, a number of theoretical prob­
lems might be more effectively dealt with.
1. Confusion and possible contraditions in the Shaw-Mulder- 
Hutte research might be clarified, with the results of these studies 
being placed in the framework of outcomes of independent treatment 
of the structural dimensions of problem solving groups.
2. A step might be taken towards developing a more compre­
hensive, integrative model of group problem solving processes.
3. Such a model would provide for the systematic investiga­
tion of both the main effects and interaction of the structural; past 
research has not included such analyses.
15
The Conceptual Model
Decision making or problem solving groups are conceptualized 
as composed of two structural sub-systems. These sub-systems are the 
interaction and decision structures. Each of these structural sub­
systems may vary in the degree of centrality which is present. For­
mally, definitions are as follows:
Interaction structure - the possible number of participating 
dyads in a group; i.e., the number of dyads in which commu­
nication may occur.
Centrality of interaction structure - the number of partici­
pating dyads divided by the maximum possible number of par­
ticipating dyads.
Decision structure - the number of members whose consent 
(agreement) is required for a decision to be rendered by 
the group.
Centrality of decision structure - the number of participat­
ing decision makers divided by the maximum possible number 
of decision makers.
It should be noted that there must always be dyadic relationships 
between decision makers, although all possible dyadic relationships 
need not occur. In addition, there must always be at least one 
dyadic link between the decision structure and the interaction 
structure.
Finally, group structure can be described by the systematic 
properties of the interaction and decision structures. That is, the 
decision structure might be described as possessing the characteristic
16
of high or low centrality. Similarly, the interaction structure might 
be described as possessing one of these systematic characteristics.
To the extent that both interaction and decision structures are 
described in the same terms there is said to be structural congruence. 
To the extent that these structures are described by dissimilar terms, 
e.g.,high decision centrality vs. low interaction centrality, there 
is said to be structural incongruence.
Figure 2 contains various combinations of high and low cen­
trality of both intereaction and decision structures. Based on a 4 
person group, intereaction and decision centrality are arbitrarily 
defined as follows:
Interaction centrality (IC) - high = 3 dyads
low = 6 dyads
Decision centrality (DC) - high = 1 decision maker
low = 4 decision makers
Structural Congruence Centrality Net











Fig. 2. Decision and interaction structures in 4 person groups.
The circles represent positions, lines represent com­




The present research can be schematically represented as follows
group structure---------- 5> group processes----------V outcomes.
That is, varying interaction and decision centrality in group structure 
will lead to differences in group processes, e.g., opinion-information 
transmission regarding problem solution. These will lead to differ­
ences in group and individual outcomes, e.g., problem solutions and sub­
jective satisfaction.
Hypothesis 1: Indices of centrality of group processes will 
reflect an interaction based on the congruence of the decision and 
interaction structures.
Hypothesis 2a: The problem solving effectiveness of the groups 
will reflect an interaction based on the congruence of the decision and 
interaction structures.
Hypothesis 2b: The subjective satisfaction in the groups will 
reflect an interaction based on the congruence of the decision and 
interaction structures.
Within interaction structures of high or low centrality (see 
Figure 2), 1 or 4 positions might be designated in the decision struc­
ture. According to Mulder the fewer the number of persons contained 
in the decision structure the more likely the group is to be effective 
in its problem solving. Conversely, according to Hutte the greater 
the number of persons contained in the decision structure the more 
likely the group is to be effective in problem solving. The most 
effective problem solving groups, based on Mulder's research, would 
be Groups 1 and 2 in Figure 2. The most effective groups, based on
18
Hutte's research, would be Groups 3 and 4. Predictions based on a 
theory of structural congruence would indicate that those groups which 
are structurally congruent will be most effective in their problem 
solutions; in this case, Groups 1 and 4.
Neither Mulder nor Hutte have concerned themselves with sub­
jective satisfaction in problem solving groups. However, Shaw has 
found that groups with decentralized interaction structures tend to 
indicate greater satisfaction. Shaw has accounted for this via the 
concept of independence. However, Shaw's concept of independence, 
as developed earlier, is a one dimensional concept, relating to the 
interaction structure. Here, if used as a base for predictions, it 
must be extended to encompass both interaction and decision struc­
tures. Simpler, more parsimonious predictions can be based on the 




Following the general procedures of the early Bavelas and 
Leavitt research, Ss were seated in the groups so that each S was 
separated from those persons adjacent to him by a vertical partition 
from the table's center to its edge. The partitions contained slots 
which permitted Ss to transmit written messages wherever slots were 
open. Slots were selectively opened to construct wheel and all chan­
nel nets to represent the decision and interaction structures in 
Figure 2 (see above, p. 16). Each of the group positions was desig­
nated by a colored letter, visible to all group members, and Ss were 
supplied with message slips whose color matched those of the letter. 
Any message sent from a group position, or booth, was on a message 
slip. Decision maker positions in the groups were indicated by mark­
ing that booth with an X which was visible to all group members.
Construction of Experimental Conditions
The Ss, 96 male undergraduate volunteers from the University 
of North Dakota, were randomly assigned to both experimental condi­
tions and positions within groups. The experimental conditions, with 
decision and interaction structures representing those indicated in 
Figure 2, were as follows:
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Condition 1. Decision centrality high, interaction centrality 
high: The person in position A was designated as the decision maker,
and held the sole responsibility for rendering the final decision on 
the solution to the problem. The interaction was highly centralized, 
and focused on position A. Position A could communicate directly with 
any of the other position, however B, C, and D could communicate 
directly only with A. In order for B, C, or D to communicate with 
each other the messages had to pass through A.
Condition 2. Decision centrality high, interaction centrality 
low: The person in position A was the decision maker, as in Condition 
1, however communication took place in an all channel net. A person 
in any position could communicate directly with a person in any other 
position.
Condition 3. Decision centrality low, interaction centrality 
high: The groups were operating under consensus in their decision 
making; all members had to agree on a solution to the problem before 
a decision could be rendered. Communication was centralized, with 
only position A communicating directly with other positions. Posi­
tions B, C, and D could communicate with each other only through 
position A.
Condition 4. Decision centrality low, interaction centrality 
low: The groups operated under consensus, as in Condition 3, and 
communication could flow directly between any position, as in Con­
dition 2.
Six groups (n=6) were obtained for each of the 4 types of
situations.
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Cells 1 and 4 were described as structurally congruent, and
Cells 2 and 3 as structurally incongruent.
The problems which the groups were required to solve were 3
complex problems designed by Shaw (1954b), and widely used in problem
solving research (see Table 1). The problems were as follows:
Problem 1. A small company is moving from one office building 
to another. It must move four kinds of equipment: chairs, . 
desks, filing cabinets, and typewriters. How many trucks are 
needed to make the move in one trip?
Items of information:
Each truck will carry 12 typewriters and nothing else.
The company owns a total of 15 filing cabinets.
The company owns a total of 12 typewriters.
Each truck will carry 5 filing cabinets and nothing else.
Each truck will carry 24 chairs and nothing else.
Each truck will carry 3 desks and nothing else.
The company owns a total of 48 chairs.
' The company owns a total of 12 desks. Answer: 10 trucks.
Problem 2. A clothing dealer wanted to dispose of some of his 
winter clothing at the beginning of summer. He marked down 
the following items: coats, sweaters, trousers and shirts.
What was the total amount of reduction?
Items of information:
Each coat was reduced from $30 to $18.
There were 22 coats altogether.
Each sweater was reduced from $20 to $13.
There were 5 sweaters altogether.
Each pair of trousers were reduced from $15 to $12.50.
There were 14 pairs of trousers altogether.
Each shirt was reduced from $10 to $7.50.
Altogether, there were 20 shirts. Answer: $384.
high low




1 Cell 3 1 n=6 Cell 4 n=6
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Problem 3. Your group represents an electrical concern and 
you must decide how much to bid on a job of installing light­
ing equipment for a stadium. What will you bid?
Items of information:
The stadium must have 10 banks of lights.
Each bank of lights requires 20 light bulbs.
Each bank of lights requires 2 steel poles for support.
Light bulbs cost $1 each.
Steel poles cost $50 each.
10,000 feet of wire will be required.
The wire costs $5 per 1,000 feet.
You want to make a profit of $1,000. Answer: $2,250.
Upon arrival in the experimental setting, Ss were randomly
assigned to experimental conditions and positions within groups. Then,
the following instructions were read:
Each of you are now members of a small group. The purpose of 
each group is to solve 3 problems which will be given to you.
You are sitting behind a panel which has slots open to other 
positions in the group. The purpose of these slots is to 
provide you with channels for written communication with the 
persons in your group. All communications are to be written.
No talking will be permitted. Before you are note pads.
These are for you to use in communicating with members of 
your group. Keep your messages simple. Try to communicate 
only one thing when you write a message. For each new com­
munication use a new slip of paper. When passing on or add­
ing to an old communication, make sure you endorse the message.
Notice that each position in each group is designed by the 
letter A, B, C, or D. Use these letters when sending messages.
The slots allow you to communicate in certain directions. Some 
of you can communicate with every member of your small group.
Others of you can communicate with only one other member of 
your small group. In any case, you can communicate with only 
in the directions indicated by the slots. If you wish to com­
municate with someone where there is no slot, this must be 
done through the help of others in the group acting as relays 
for you.
Some positions are marked with an X. An X indicates a decision 
maker. That is, the person or persons in positions marked with 
an X must make the final decision on the group's solution to 
the problem. In 2 groups, one person has this final decision 
to make. When he feels that the group has reached a solution 
which is satisfactory to him, he will inform the research
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assistant. In 2 groups this decision making is shared by all 
members of the group. They must all agree on the solution to 
the problem. In these groups the problem is not considered 
solved until all the groups' members agree on the solution.
The research assistants will now answer any questions you 
might have. Afterwards they will distribute the first prob­
lem. With the problem, they will give each of you some, but 
not all, of the information needed to solve the problem.
Your job is to work out ways of putting the information 
together and solving the problem.
You will be timed. Try to work efficiently, but do not try 
to work so rapidly that you destroy your group's problem 
solving effectiveness.
After the instructions had been read, each E answered questions 
from the Ss. Following this, Ss were asked if they were ready to begin. 
Each group member was then given three 5" x 7" note cards. On the 
first was the problem. On the second and third cards were single ele­
ments of information necessary in the solution of the problem. The 
total of information for each problem was randomly distributed among 
group members. When Ss had received the three information cards, E 
signaled them to begin reading the cards. At that time E began record­
ing the group's time to solution.
When the group had completed the problem E recorded the time 
to solution. E then collected the solution to the problem, and all 
messages transmitted during the problem solving process. Upon comple­
tion of the third problem the following 100 mm length rating scales 
were filled out by all Ss:
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See if you can recall how you felt about your job on each problem. 














Place a check on the following scale to indicate your view of your




Did your group have a leader? If so, who (which position, A, B, C, D)?




Treatment of the Data
Because of negative skewness in the rating scale data, and 
positive skewness in the latency data, all data were subjected to a 
logarithmic transformation before being analyzed by an analysis of 
variance. The original data is presented in the Appendix. The data 
presented in the mean, and analysis of variance summary tables are 
logarithmic values.
The Congruence Model and Indices of Group Process
Hypothesis 1 predicted that indices of group process would 
reflect the congruence of the decision and interaction structures. 
The two indices employed in the present study were the number of 
information transactions and time to solution on each problem.
Information transactions are defined as sums of the number 
of messages sent and received for each position, in each structural 
condition, on each problem. Table 2 presents the means and analysis 
of variance summary of the log of the number of information transac­
tions for each position in each of the 4 types of situations. Sig­
nificant main effects were found across positions, and for the con­
ditions of decision and interaction centrality. Significant inter­
actions occurred between position by interaction centrality, and
25
TABLE 2









IC low DC high DC low IC high IC low Overall
N 6 6 6 6 12 12 12 12 24
Position A X 1.974 1.996 2.365 2.146 1.985 2.255 2.169 2.071 2.120
S 0.313 0.146 0.207 0.182 0.233 0.218 0.325 0.176 0.260
Position B X 1.456 1.855 1.940 2.112 1.655 2.026 1.698 1.983 1.841
S 0.409 0.188 0.192 0.151 0.369 0.187 0.396 0.211 0.343
Position C X 1.506 1.897 1.969 2.131 1.702 2.050 1.738 2.014 1.876
S 0.319 0.181 0.200 0.162 0.321 0.193 0.350 0.204 0.314
Position D X 1.481 1.914 1.812 2.103 1.698 1.958 1.646 2.009 1.828
s 0.331 0.131 0.193 0.220 0.330 0.249 0.310 0.199 0.315
Overall X 1.604 1.916 2.021 2.123 1.760 2.072 1.813 2.020 1.916
S 0.389 0.161 0.280 0.169 0.334 0.235 0.396 0.194 0.327
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TABLE 2— Continued
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Position (A) 1.3625490 3 0.4541829 8.3582**
Decision Centrality (B) 2.3422850 1 2.3422850 43.1045**
Interaction Centrality (C) 1.0261230 1 1.0261230 18.8835**
A X B 0.0551757 3 0.1839193 0.3384
A X C 0.7695313 3 0.2565104 4.7205**
B X C 0.2636719 1 0.2636719 4.8529*
A X B X C 0.0100097 3 0.0033365 0.0614




decision by interaction centrality. These are graphically illustrated 
in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
Note in Figure 3 that position A has the highest mean number of 
information transactions in all conditions except that of low decision 
and low interaction centrality. This reflects the key role played by 
position A in either the decision or interaction structures, or both, 
under all but the latter condition. No appreciable differences 
occurred between the other positions. The interaction of position by 
interaction centrality reflects the communication demands placed on 
position A under the condition of high interaction centrality; that 






















Fig. 3. Log of the number of information transactions for 
the interaction of group position and the condi­





















Fig. 4. Log of the number of information transactions for the 
interaction of decision and interaction centrality.
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Table 3 summarizes findings regarding the number of information 
transactions to solution of each problem for the A types of groups. 
Significant, or near significant, main effects were found for the con­
ditions of high or low decision and interaction centrality across the 
3 problems. That is, the number of information transactions decreased 
from problem 1 through problem 3; was lower under the condition of high 
decision centrality; and was lower under the condition of high inter­
action centrality. Problem 1 required significantly fewer information 
transactions than problems 2 or 3, p <.05.
However, Table 3 also indicates an interaction between the con­
ditions of decision and interaction centrality. This is graphically 
presented in Figure 5. It indicates that predictions regarding the 
number of information transactions necessary to reach problem solution 
should be made with consideration given to the structural congruence 
of the decision and interaction structures. This finding provides sup­
port for Hypothesis 1.
In Figure 6 some characteristics of structurally congruent and 
incongruent groups become apparent. When the dimensions of decision 
and interaction centrality are both high or low, described as structur­
ally congruent groups, there occurred a progressive decrease in the 
number of information transactions necessary to reach problem solution.
The preceding was not true for groups operating with incon­
gruent decision and interaction structures. The ordinal relationships 
for frequency of information transactions on problems 2 and 3 were dif­
ferent from those found with structurally congruent models.
TABLE 3









IC low DC high DC low IC high IC low Overall
N 6 6 6 6 12 12 12 12 24
Problem 1 X 1.857 2.087 2.328 2.367 1.972 2.348 2.093 2.227 2.160
S 0.166 0.175 0.171 0.105 0.202 0.137 0.294 0.201 0.256
Problem 2 X 1.755 1.992 2.096 2.162 1.873 2.120 1.926 2.077 2.001
s 0.498 0.198 0.169 0.233 0.382 0.197 0.397 0.224 0.325
Problem 3 X 1.670 2.012 2.165 2.156 1.845 2.161 1.922 2.084 2.003
s 0.382 0.183 0.257 0.254 0.335 0.243 0.401 0.224 0.328
Overall X 1.763 2.030 2.197 2.229 1.897 2.213 1.980 2.129 2.005








Problem (A) 0.3977051 2 0.1988525 3.0690+
Decision Centrality (B) 1.7961430 1 1.7961430 27.7256**
Interaction Centrality (C) 0.4016113 1 0.4016113 6.1993* 
A X B 0.0429687 2 0.0214843 0.3316
A X C 0.0024414 2 0.0012207 0.0188
B X C 0.2478027 1 0.2478027 3.8251+
A X B X C 0.0263671 2 0.0131835 0.2035





Table 4 presents means and summary of analysis of variance for 
the log of time to solution, in seconds, for each type group across the 
3 problems. Significant main effects are indicated across problems, 
and under the conditions of decision centrality. A near significant 
interaction occurs between the conditions of decision and interaction 
centrality. Thus, time to solution cannot be predicted on the basis 
of knowledge of the decision structure alone. These findings are 
indicated in Figure 7.
Mulder's findings of virtually the same time to solution for 






















Fig. 5. Log of the number of information transactions to 
solution for the interaction of the conditions of 






















Fig. 6. Log of number of information transactions to solution 
for each problem under the conditions of structural 
congruence.
TABLE 4








IC low DC high DC low IC high IC low Overall
N 6 6 6 6 12 12 12 12 24
Problem 1 X 2.802 2.927 3.195 3.101 2.864 3.148 2.998 3.014 3.006
S 0.128 0.244 0.157 0.135 0.197 0.148 0.247 0.209 0.224
Problem 2 X 2.658 2.689 3.000 2.897 2.674 2.949 2.829 2.793 2.811
S 0.336 0.228 0.194 0.212 0.274 0.201 0.316 0.236 0.274
Problem 3 X 2.596 2.679 2.959 2.847 2.637 2.903 2.778 2.763 2.770
S 0.212 0.186 0.272 0.281 0.195 0.270 0.300 0.243 0.267
Overall X 2.685 2.765 3.051 2.948 2.725 3.000 2.868 2.857 2.862
s 0.243 0.239 0.226 0.233 0.241 0.233 0.297 0.251 0.273
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TABLE 4— Continued
Summary of Analysis of Variance 
Source of Variation SS df MS
Problem (A) 0.7624512 2 0.3812256 7.6594* *
Decision Centrality (B) 1.3601070 1 1.3601070 27.32668**
Interaction Centrality (C) 0.0024414 1 0.0024414 0.0490
A X B 0.0007324 2 0.0003662 0.0073
A X C 0.0075683 2 0.0037841 0.0760
B X C 0.1503906 1 0.1503906 3.0215+
A X B X C 0.0058593 2 0.0029296 0.0588




decision structure was present in both nets, did not occur here. Rather, 
the conditions of interaction under which a centralized or decentralized 
decision structure operated were of considerable importance, leading to 
the interaction between the conditions of decision and interaction cen­
trality. Thus, within the conditions of structurally congruent or 
incongruent decision and interaction systems, structurally congruent 
groups took less time than structurally incongruent groups. This find­
ing lends support to Hypothesis 1.
As a further means of validating the existence and functioning 
of centralized or decentralized decision structures, Ss were asked for













Fig. 7. Log number of seconds to solution for the interaction 
of the conditions of group structure.
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for each position under the conditions of high and low decision cen­
trality. Observed column totals differ because of some Ss nominating 
more than one leader. The data indicate that leadership was perceived 
to be more focalized, or concentrated in a limited number of positions, 
under the condition of high, rather than low, decision centrality.
This finding serves to validate the hypothesized establishment of 
centralized or decentralized decision structures.
TABLE 5





Decision Centrality High Decision Centrality Low
Observed Expected Observed Expected
A 39 21.32 8 25.67
B 3 6.35 11 7.64
C 3 6.35 11 7.64
D 2 3.62 7 4.91
No Leader 2 10.88 22 13.11
X2 = 47.96, p <.001
The Congruence Model and Outcomes
Hypothesis 2a predicted that the greater the congruence between 
the decision and interaction structures, the greater would be the prob­
lem solving effectiveness of the group.
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Each group's solution to each problem was categorized as right 
or wrong. These dichotomous data were analyzed with Cochran's Q. A 
frequency summary is indicated in Table 6. The significant Cochran's 
Q (DC high < DC low) indicates that a decentralized decision structure 
was significantly more accurate than a centralized decision structure. 
The centrality of the interaction structure had virtually no effect on 
accuracy of problem solving. These data do not lend support to 
Hypothesis 2a. Neither do these data support models of problem solv­
ing advanced by Mulder or Shaw e_t al. (see Figure 1) .
TABLE 6
ACCURACY OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS 1-3
Right Wrong Right Wrong Z Right
Decision Centrality
high 8 10 10 8 18*






*Cochran's Q, DC high vs DC low = 9.00, p <.01
**Cochran's Q, IC high vs IC low = 0.28, p <.70
Table 7 indicates summaries of means and analysis of variance 
of log rated effectiveness of problem solving in each type group. A 
significant main effect was found for the condition of decision cen­
trality. Ss in groups constructed with centralized decision struc­
tures rated their groups as significantly more effective in problem
TABLE 7








IC low DC high DC low IC high IC low Overall
N 6 6 6 6 12 12 12 12 24
X 1.85 1.81 1.69 1.71 1.83 1.70 1.77 1.76 1.76
S 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.20 -.09 0.17 0.15 0.16 -0.14
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Decision Centrality (A) 0.0970154 1 0.09740154 4.6093**
Interaction Centrality (B) 0.0002747 1 0.0002747 0.0130
A X B 0.0050812 1 0.0050812 0.2414




solving than Ss in groups with decentralized decision structures. It 
should be noted that this finding contrasts with that concerning prob­
lem solving accuracy (see Table 6), which indicated that groups with 
decentralized decision structures were significantly more accurate 
than groups with centralized decision structures. These findings 
are contrasted in Figure 8.
Table 8 summarizes the means and analysis of variance of log 
rated effectiveness of problem solving for each position in each type 
group. While a significant main effect is indicated for the condi­
tions of decision centrality, an interaction between position in each 
group and the condition of decision centrality approaches significance. 
This would indicate that the unique configurations of these factors 
should be taken into account before interpreting these data. An 
internal inspection of the data indicated that most of the variance 
leading to the position by decision centrality interaction occurred 
under the condition in which decision centrality was low and inter­
action centrality was high. Further, within this condition, position 
D, and to a lesser extent position C, accounted for most of the vari­
ance. This can be noted in Figure 9.
Overall, the data in Table 8 do not lend support to Hypothesis 
2a. A decentralized decision structure, whether operating under the 
contingencies of a centralized or decentralized interaction structure, 
was perceived as more effective in its problem solving than a cen­
tralized decision structure.
Hypothesis 2b predicted that subjective satisfaction would be 






















Fig. 8. Contrast of rated effectiveness and number of correct 
solutions under conditions of decision centrality.
TABLE 8









IC low DC high DC low IC high IC low Overall
N 6 6 6 6 12 12 12 12 24
Position A X 1.835 1.806 1.568 1.858 1.820 1.713 1.702 1.832 1.767
s 0.141 0.137 0.449 0.110 0.134 0.346 0.347 0.121 0.263
Position B X 1.870 1.810 1.706 1.582 1.840 1.644 1.788 1.696 1.742
s 0.100 0.098 0.234 0.545 0.100 0.405 0.191 0.392 0.305
Position C X 1.515 1.538 1.769 1.525 1.526 1.647 1.642 1.531 1.587
s 0.643 0.495 0.211 0.750 0.547 0.541 0.475 0.606 0.535
Position D X 1.893 1.925 1.147 1.544 1.909 1.346 1.520 1.735 1.627
s 0.110 0.061 0.810 0.511 0.086 0.678 0.675 0.400 0.553
Overall X 1.778 1.770 1.548 1.627 1.774 1.587 1.663 1.698 1.681









Position (A) 0.5495605 3 0.1831868 1.0390
Decision Centrality (B) 0.8356934 1 0.8356934 4.7401*
Interaction Centrality (C) 0.0305175 1 0.0305175 0.1731
A X B 1.4550780 3 0.4850260 2.7511+
A X C 0.4719238 3 0.1573079 0.8922
B X C 0.0466308 1 0.0466308 0.2645
A X B X C 0.4196777 3 0.1398926 0.7934




Subjective satisfaction was measured by the like-dislike reac­
tions for Ss on each of the 3 problems. Table 9 presents a summary of 
means and analysis of variance for log rated satisfaction across the 
3 problems. The conditions of interaction centrality lead to a near 
significant main effect, with decentralized interaction structures 
more satisfying than centralized interaction structures. Earlier 
research, e.g.,Bavelas and Leavitt, had focused largely on simple 
centralized-decentralized interaction net comparisons, e.g., circle 
compared to wheel nets, and has indicated that spread interaction 
nets were more satisfying than centralized interaction nets. The 
present findings are consistent with past research. These data do 














Fig. 9. Log of rated problem solving effectiveness for 
interaction of position and decision centrality.
TABLE 9








IC low DC high DC low IC high IC low Overall
N 6 6 6 6 12 12 12 12 24
Problem 1 X 1.703 1.775 1.684 1.830 1.739 1.757 1.694 1.803 1.748
S 0.110 0.124 0.204 0.088 0.118 0.168 0.156 0.107 0.142
Problem 2 X 1.780 1.866 1.802 1.856 1.823 1.829 1.791 1.861 1.826
S 0.097 0.099 0.106 0.095 0.104 0.100 0.098 0.093 0.100
Problem 3 X 1.789 1.785 1.733 1.774 1.787 1.754 1.761 1.780 1.770
S 0.221 0.216 0.127 0.143 0.208 0.131 0.174 0.175 0.171
Overall X 1.757 1.809 1.740 1.820 1.783 1.780 1.748 1.814 1.781
S 0.149 0.151 0.151 0.110 0.150 0.137 0.148 0.131 0.143
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TABLE 9— Continued
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Problem (A) 0.0771637 2 0.0385818 1.8626
Decision Centrality (B) 0.0001831 1 0.0001831 0.0088
Interaction Centrality (C) 0.0780944 1 0.00780944 3.7701+
A X B 0.0084991 2 0.0042495 0.2051
A X C 0.0246124 2 0.0123062 0.5941
B X C 0.0037384 1 0.0037384 0.1804
A X B X C 0.0094757 2 0.0047378 0.2287
Error 1.2428280 60 0.0207138
Total 1.4445948 71
+ p <.10
Table 10 summarizes an analysis of variance on log like-dislike
reactions across positions in each type group. There are no signifi-
cant findings. These data do not lend support to Hypothesis 2b.
Overall these findings yielded mixed support for a congruence 
model of small group problem solving. Indices of group process indi­
cate that structural congruence is an important consideration. How­
ever, the outcomes of accuracy, perceived effectiveness, and satis­
faction indicate that attention should be given to the conditions of 
the decision and interaction structures respectively. Whether these 
structures were congruent was not of critical importance.
TABLE 10








IC low DC high DC low IC high IC low Overall
N 6 6 6 6 12 12 12 12 24
Position A X 1.824 1.813 1.754 1.853 1.818 1.803 1.784 1.833 1.811
S 0.171 0.062 0.141 0.108 0.123 0.131 0.154 0.087 0.124
Position B X 1.566 1.772 1.738 1.795 1.669 1.766 1.652 1.784 1.718
S 0.626 0.084 0.130 0.098 0.439 0.114 0.440 0.088 0.318
Position C X 1.334 1.745 1.782 1.588 1.540 1.685 1.558 1.667 1.612
S 0.873 0.176 0.098 0.680 0.638 0.474 0.637 0.481 0.555
Position D X 1.758 1.876 1.600 1.588 1.817 1.594 1.679 1.732 1.705
S 0.308 0.071 0.408 0.680 0.222 0.535 0.355 0.485 0.416
Overall X 1.620 1.802 1.718 1.706 1.711 1.712 1.669 1.754 1.712
S 0.562 0.113 0.227 0.470 0.411 0.365 0.427 0.341 0.387
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TABLE 10— Continued
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Position (A) 0.4746094 3 0.1582301 1.019
Decision Centrality (B) 0.000000 1 0.0000000 0.000
Interaction Centrality (C) 0.1716309 1 0.1716309 1.1059
A X B 0.4833984 3 0.1611328 1.038
A X C 0.0322265 3 0.0107421 0.0692
B X C 0.2248535 1 0.2248535 1.4488
A X B X C 0.4038086 3 0.1346028 0.8673




The experimental treatment of a decision structure in past small 
group research has been virtually non-existent. At best, decision 
structure has been treated as an emergent phenomenon, one which occurs 
as people interact and find themselves under pressures for a group deci­
sion. While this sort of situation certainly has analogues in society, 
the analogues lie primarily in the relatively unstructured, informal 
domains of social interaction. In the more formal domains, including 
most complex organizations, problem solving groups do not wait on emer­
gent decision structures before handling their problems.
The present research was an attempt to come to grips with some 
of the complexities of making decisions in small group problem solving. 
The framework not only departed from those of most past research, it 
also moved away from some relatively simple traditional assumptions 
about the nature of decision making in small groups. Throughout the 
literature of information theory, decision making, group problem solv­
ing, and computer simulation of group decision making, there has been 
the assumption that one, and perhaps the, primary factor in accurate 
decision making is the participants' reception of adequate information 
on which to base a group decision. If this condition is attained, the 
reasoning continues, an appropriate decision will usually be reached. 
However, when an appropriate decision was not reached, it has been
50
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assumed that this was due to human imperfection. The adequacy of the 
model was not questioned. The present research would suggest that the 
adequacy of the model might be questioned, and that attention to the 
organized conditions under which men make decisions may be as impor­
tant as the presence of an adequate informational base for decision 
making.
The congruence model originated with an attempt to synthesize 
conflicting findings in past research. It was designed to extend and 
elaborate theoretical conceptions of group decision making in the 
solution of complex problems. Hypotheses were advanced which pre­
dicted that indices of both group process and objective and subjec­
tive outcomes would reflect the extent to which there was structural 
congruence between the conditions of decision and interaction cen­
trality.
Summarized, the findings of the present study are as follows:
1. Indices of group process, time and number of information 
transactions to solution, reflect the congruence of the decision and 
interaction structures. These findings support a structural con­
gruence model.
2. Indices of outcomes, i.e., problem solving accuracy, rated 
problem solving effectiveness, and satisfaction, do not reflect the 
congruence of the decision and interaction structures. These findings 
do not support a structural congruence model. However, neither do they 
support prevailing models of group problem solving.
3. In terms of problem solving accuracy, the present findings 
indicate that a decentralized decision structure will be most accurate.
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This supports the tentative findings of Hutte, and is clearly contra­
dictory to the conclusions of Mulder. It also suggests that Shaw's 
earlier conclusions regarding the effectiveness of a spread interac­
tion structure might be revised in terms of a decision structure.
4. The present findings indicate that Ss perceive their 
groups to be more effective at solving problems if they are operat­
ing within decision structures which are centralized. However, these 
groups are less accurate than those in which the decision structure 
is decentralized. In relative terms, one group is overestimating and 
the other group is underestimating its effectiveness. Past research 
has not examined these relationships.
5. Satisfaction in the present study conforms to findings in 
previous research. A decentralized interaction structure is more 
satisfying than a centralized interaction structure. No relationship 
was found between satisfaction and high or low decision centrality.
The latter fails to confirm Maier and Hoffman's (1960) finding of a 
relationship between decision making power and satisfaction.
Traditionally there has been an association between the con­
cepts of group structure and group process. The phrase, group struc­
ture and process, is not only a phrase, but also a conceptual link and 
a belief which is virtually imprinted on the minds of small group 
researchers. In a similar manner there has been a traditionally 
accepted belief that group process leads to outcome. While the pre­
sent research supports the first belief, it raises questions about 
the latter, or at least the conditions under which it is accurate.
That is, indices of group process support a congruence model. It
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does make a difference in group process if the decision and interaction 
structures are operating under similar or different conditions. How­
ever, the same cannot be said regarding outcomes. There, a decentral­
ized decision structure is critical, at least in terms of accuracy and 
perceived effectiveness.
It is possible that group process is not necessarily related 
to outcome; or, that group process is related to outcome, however, not 
necessarily on the indices or under the conditions employed in this 
study.
Past research does not support either of the above possibilities 
with respect to time (Shaw, 1954a; Mulder, 1960). Time has been found to 
be related to accuracy, and the relationship has been one of less time 
per problem, with corresponding increases in accuracy. The present 
research raises questions both about this relationship, and the models 
within which it has been conceptualized and investigated in the past.
Similarly, the number of messages to solution has been shown 
to decrease as accuracy increased (Mulder, 1960). Such was not the 
case here. The number of messages decreased with successive problems 
in groups which were structurally congruent (see Figure 6). Structur­
ally incongruent groups showed a decrement through the second problem 
then a rise in the number of information transactions in the third 
problem. In absolute terms, the number of messages to solution in 
groups with centralized decision structures were fewer than the num­
ber of messages to solution in groups with decentralized decision 
structures. This might, in part, account for Mulder's findings. It 
remains, however, that there was an interaction between decision and
54
interaction structures on this variable. Further, groups which were 
most accurate were not those with fewest total number of information 
transactions, as Mulder found, rather, accuracy was related to a 
higher overall number of communications.
The variables of time and number of messages to solution have 
traditionally been variables which have been inversely related to accu­
racy. The dissonant relationship between the present research and 
traditional findings may lie in previous conceptual models of small 
group problem solving not taking into account sufficient dimensions 
of the complexity of problem solving.
The lack of support for either the congruence model, or models 
used in previous research, with respect to the outcomes of accuracy 
and perceived accuracy raises problems. Mulder's work had suggested 
that earlier conceptualizations of decision making in small groups 
(e.g., that of Shaw) were theoretically inadequate. And, that research 
might be better designed in terms of an emergent decision structure, 
rather than focusing on the interaction structure. Mulder seemed to 
be asking if a centralized decision structure could not be emerging, 
even within a decentralized interaction structure.
However, Mulder's research did not attempt to systematically 
control or vary the nature of the decision structure. Rather, it 
seemed to be based on the assumption that, if left to its own devices, 
groups would produce an emergent decision structure. And, as this 
occurred, problem solving accuracy would improve. Conversely, if a 
decision structure did not emerge, problem solving accuracy would 
not improve, or at least, would not improve greatly. However, making
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comparisons between groups in which a decision structure emerged and 
groups in which a decision structure did not emerge, raises serious 
questions about the nature of the comparisons. That is, were the 
comparisons in Mulder's research being made between the presence or 
absence of emergent decision structures, or between groups which did 
or did not have certain unknown characteristics which led to the 
development of a decision structure? If, in the short period of 
time provided it, a group was unable to generate a decision structure 
in order to solve problems, it would seem to follow that that group 
might be relatively inaccurate in solving problems. Thus, Mulder's 
findings indicating the problem solving superiority of centralized 
decision structures might be reinterpreted to indicate only that 
centralized decision structures emerge within some groups. When 
these structures do emerge, the groups which develop them will show 
greater accuracy in problem solving than groups which do not gener­
ate decision structures.
While it may be true that an emergent, centralized decision 
structure is better than no emergent decision structure, the present 
research indicates clearly that a decentralized decision structure 
is more accurate than a centralized decision structure.
The present findings regarding subjects perceived effective­
ness of their groups' problem solving contrasts sharply with reality, 
the latter defined in terms of the known accuracy of the groups (see 
Figure 8). It is possible that this finding is in some way related 
to the type of decision structure which emerged in Mulder's research. 
That is, if people believe a centralized decision structure will be 
more effective than a decentralized structure, and they are placed
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in an unstructured situation and told to solve problems as rapidly as 
possible, it would seem reasonable that a centralized decision struc­
ture might emerge. Whether this is the most accurate form of decision 
structure which could emerge is another question. The present data 
would suggest that it is not.
Questions regarding why the accuracy findings did not corre­
spond with indices of group process might also be raised. Possible 
answers may lie in the lack of control which previous researchers have 
placed on decision making structures in small groups. The present 
research indicates that the decision structure, and the surrounding 
beliefs about what is an effective decision structure, is probably 
an important, but certainly neglected, variable in virtually all pre­
vious problem solving research. This raises the possibility that if 
many of the problem solving studies upon which our present fund of 
information is built were to be repeated, including controls for a 
decision structure, the results in some cases might not conform to 
previous findings.
Finally, neither do the findings regarding satisfaction con­
form to the congruence model. For most subjects, satisfaction appeared 
to be a simple function of the freedom of interaction. Again, these 
findings do not conform to indices of group process; satisfaction does 
not appear to be dependent upon congruence of decision and interaction 
structures. This finding might be altered, however, if controls were 
added for subject variables. For example, persons with high needs for 
power might respond quite differently to various combinations of deci­
sion and interaction structures than would persons with high needs for
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affiliation. Schacter (1959) has noted that volunteers for psychology- 
experiments tend to be higher in needs for affiliation than non­
volunteers. The present Ss were volunteers, and possibly were respond' 
ing to the openness of the respective interaction nets in terms of 
their needs for affiliation. This would account for the present find­
ings regarding satisfaction in centralized and decentralized interac­
tion structures. Given the possibility that certain complex organiza­
tions tend to attract, retain, and promote into high level decision 
making groups, persons who possess certain personality traits, this 
dimension takes on considerable significance for future research.
Based on the findings of this study, it might be generally 
predicted that a group which contains a decentralized decision struc­
ture will be more accurate in solving complex problems than a group 
with a centralized decision structure. This group will be neither 
the most rapid nor perform the task in the fewest number of informa­
tion transactions. If the dimension of a decentralized interaction 
structure is added to this group, the participants will, in all prob­
ability, like their task more than if the interaction structure is 
relatively centralized. The Ss will bring into the group setting 
certain pressures and preferences for a centralized decision struc­
ture. If allowed a choice, a centralized decision structure will 
probably be the result. However, such a choice will lead to a rela­
tively inaccurate performance.
Complex organizations, e.g., governmental bureaucracies, cor­
porations, the Armed Forces, perhaps more frequently than not will 
be found to operate under some form of a centralized decision
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structure. Western society seems to socialize its members in the belief 
that some one person is to be responsible for the actions of virtually 
any group. Consequently, decision systems and the distribution of 
social power are constructed and arranged to reflect this belief. This 
study raises serious questions about the practical effectiveness of this 
belief and practice, at least under certain conditions, and suggests 
that to the extent that all group members are involved in the decision 
making process and possess real decision power, more effective checks 
and balances will be instituted. These will lead to more accurate deci­
sions .
Whether a congruence model, built upon relative centrality of 
decision and interaction structures, is the most appropriate model 
within which to conceptualize numerous dimensions of small group prob­
lem solving is an open question. Support was found for the model in 
dimensions of group rpocess, but not for outcomes. This led to ques­
tions being raised regarding the extent to which a simple, relatively 
global, model of small group problem solving has been an accurate 
reflection of reality. At the minimum this research indicates the 
need for independent treatment of decision and interaction structures, 
and their respective degrees of centrality, on indices of group pro­
cess and problem solving outcomes. Further, this research raises 
questions about a rather lage number of past findings in which con­
clusions were drawn regarding decision making within varying inter­
action structures, but which did not in any systematic manner control 
for the nature of the decision structure. Future attempts to under­
stand the conditions and dynamics of organized decision making sys­
tems should give consideration to these factors.
.
ORIGINAL DATA, NUMBER OF INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS TO SOLUTION, TYPE OF GROUP







1 2 3 4 5 6 X S
A high high 115 131 51 80 39 291 117.83 91.96
A high low 157 - 128 92 59 98 89 103.83 34.10
A low high 260 403 382 132 143 204 254.00 116.90
A low low 118 100 156 136 99 304 152.17 77.52
B high high 48 38 11 27 9 111 40.67 37.62
B high low 128 111 55 48 77 47 77.67 34.58
B low high 93 138 130 68 42 92 93.83 36.38
B low low 136 114 125 133 79 232 136.50 51.14
C high high 23 51 18 29 16 111 41.33 36.39
C high low 118 113 72 41 102 60 84.33 31.27
C low high 86 163 127 118 47 66 101.17 42.84
C low low 151 126 111 109 98 272 144.50 65.09
D high high 66 42 12 24 14 69 37.83 25.33
D high low 119 102 71 52 95 72 85.17 24.49
D low high 77 96 115 40 52 42 70.33 30.85









CO co co m
ORIGINAL DATA, NUMBER OF INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS TO SOLUTION, TYPE OF GROUP











1 2 3 4 5 6 X S
high high 128 88 52 54 50 88 76.67 30.74
high low 226 124 84 86 170 96 131.00 56.66
low high 254 244 264 262 96 226 224.33 64.39
low low 241 232 262 256 146 292 238.17 49.65
high high 52 134 24 58 12 290 95.00 104.59
high low 166 168 102 56 70 80 107.00 48.84
low high 128 254 138 102 92 90 134.00 61.93
low low 162 90 172 88 116 368 166.00 105.09
high high 72 40 26 48 16 204 67.67 69.52
high low 130 162 104 48 122 92 109.67 38.60
low high 134 262 352 94 96 88 171.00 110.32













ORIGINAL DATA, TIME (IN SECONDS) TO SOLUTION, TYPE OF GROUP STRUCTURE
BY PROBLEM (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 4)
Decision Interaction Group
Centrality Centrality 1 2
high high 824 837
high low 2119 750
low high 2384 1490
low low 1069 1088
high high 315 832
high low 1082 798
low high 2115 1404
low low 694 442
high high 692 284
high low 680 706
low high 985 1517
low low 527 550
3 4 5 6 X
435 779 460 600 655.83
772 499 1218 487 974.17
1536 2206 868 1417 1650.17
1472 1208 899 2163 1316.50
240 519 191 1428 587.50
349 295 451 340 552.50
833 752 683 786 1095.50
880 662 709 1914 883.50
214 399 315 710 435.67
351 272 706 364 513.17
1720 330 584 1153 1048.17
489 690 481 2558 882.50
ORIGINAL DATA, RATED PROBLEM SOLVING EFFECTIVENESS BY TYPE OF GROUP






1 2 3 4 5 6 X S
high high 94.00 73.75 70.00 51.25 60.50 75.75 70.88 14.56
high low 63.50 42.25 74.50 72.25 57.25 83.25 65.50 14.52
low high 68.50 27.75 76.75 36.00 53.50 45.00 51.25 18.85
low low 61.25 55.75 69.00 45.75 75.50 21.00 54.71 19.48
ÔBecause of zero values, a constant of 1 was added to each raw score before the log
transformation and the analysis of variance. o j
ORIGINAL DATA, RATED PROBLEM SOLVING EFFECTIVENESS, TYPE OF GROUP







1 2 3 4 5 6 X S
A high high 100 50 49 52 78 94 70.50 23.25
A high low 38 50 77 89 61 78 65.50 19.27
A low high 61 5 84 92 37 22 50.17 34.69
A low low 56 71 82 100 50 79 73.00 18.26
B high high 88 79 95 50 63 73 74.67 16.48
B high low 70 48 50 62 73 87 65.00 14.80
B low high 50 25 96 29 50 87 56.17 29.40
B low low 60 59 53 62 82 2 53.00 26.86
C high high 93 90 86 3 5 68 57.50 42.34
C high low 50 3 51 50 25 29 47.67 30.32
C low high 67 74 64 21 77 71 62.33 20.78
C low low 68 51 61 79 78 0 56.17 29.47
D high high 85 76 50 100 96 68 79.17 18.64
D high low 96 68 90 88 71 90 83.83 11.46
D low high 96 7 63 2 50 0 36.33 39.54
D low low 61 42 80 22 92 3 50.00 34.18
o-'Because of zero values, a constant of 1 was added to each raw score before the log













ORIGINAL DATA, RATED SATISFACTION, TYPE OF GROUP STRUCTURE BY PROBLEM






1 2 3 4 5 6 X
high high 72.00 38.75 55.25 36.75 57.00 51.00 51.87
high low 61.00 44.25 72.50 75.50 39.75 76.00 61.50
low high 48.00 71.75 81.00 21.75 40.00 52.25 52.46
low low 71.25 76.25 48.25 73.75 84.25 58.75 68.75
high high 82.25 75.00 56.25 45.00 57.00 53.50 61.50
high low 82.50 46.25 83.00 80.50 77.00 80.50 74.96
low high 73.75 63.25 77.50 53.50 42.50 78.75 64.87
low low 74.00 78.50 85.75 70.00 83.00 47.00 73.04
high high 81.75 82.25 62.00 23.50 57.50 96.00 67.17
high low 22.75 62.00 73.25 73.00 75.00 90.75 66.12
low high 65.75 31.25 61.25 51.50 54.75 70.75 55.87
low low 84.75 59.75 70.00 48.50 74.25 34.50 61.96
ORIGINAL DATA, RATED SATISFACTION, TYPE OF GROUP STRUCTURE BY POSITION







1 2 3 4 5 6 X S
A high high 100.00 65.33 34.66 53.00 81.33 89.66 70.66 24.38
A high low 63.00 51.00 70.66 78.33 63.33 66.66 65.50 9.10
A low high 76.33 40.33 72.00 67.33 35.33 63.00 59.05 17.11
A low low 69.66 70.33 77.66 91.66 45.00 84.00 73.05 16.08
B high high 71.33 61.00 89.00 2.00 49.00 65.66 56.33 29.69
B high low 50.00 49.66 65.66 73.66 72.33 49.66 60.16 11.70
B low high 41.33 96.33 49.33 47.33 48.66 59.00 57.00 20.09
B low low 68.33 59.66 53.00 56.66 94.00 51.33 63.83 15.95
C high high 83.33 59.00 93.66 2.00 1.33 82.00 53.55 41.76
C high low 42.00 31.00 81.66 63.00 49.66 89.33 59.44 22.84
C low high 58.66 63.33 73.00 46.33 48.00 82.00 61.89 13.97
C low low 100.00 58.00 74.00 50.33 94.00 1.66 63.00 35.77
D high high 60.00 76.00 14.00 83.33 97.00 68.33 66.44 28.65
D high low 64.66 71.66 65.00 90.33 70.66 94.00 76.05 12.85
D low high 73.33 21.66 98.33 8.00 49.00 65.00 52.55 33.57
D low low 100.00 58.00 74.00 50.33 94.00 1.66 63.00 35.77
*, 1 4 :4....
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